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NOTE 
RENEWED COMPASSION FOR THE DYING 
IN COMPASSION IN DYING v. STATE 
OF WASHINGTON 
[Compassion) is the supreme elixir 
That overcomes the sovereignty of death. 
It is the inexhaustible treasure 
That eliminates poverty in the world. 
It is the supreme medicine 
That quells the world's disease. 
It is the tree that shelters all beings 
Wandering and tired on the path of conditioned 
existence. 
It is the universal bridge 
That leads to freedom from unhappy states of 
birth. 
It is the dawning moon of the mind 
That dispels the torment of disturbing 
conceptions. 
It is the great sun that finally removes 
The misty ignorance of the world. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Compassion In Dying v. State of Washington,2 three 
patients, five physicians, and a non-profit organization called 
Compassion in Dying challenged the constitutionality of a 
1. SOGYAL RINPOCHE, THE TIBETAN BOOK OF LMNG AND DYING 201 (1992) 
(quoting SHANTIDEVA, A GUIDE TO THE BODHISATTVA'S WAY OF LIFE 
(BODHICARYAVATARA) 34 (Stephen Batchelor trans., 1979». This passage praises the 
joys of compassion. Id. 
2. No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (opinion by 
Reinhardt, J.), reu'g 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). 
1 
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Washington State statute which bans all assisted suicide, in-
cluding physician-assisted death requested by terminally ill, 
mentally competent adults.3 The district court held the statute 
unconstitutional for violating the patient-plaintiffs' Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interests and equal protection rights." A 
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that no constitu-
tional right to die exists under either the Due Process or Equal 
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.5 The Ninth Circuit granted review en 
bane.6 The en bane court issued a decision reversing the three-
judge panel and affirming the district court's decision.7 The en 
bane court held "a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in 
determining the time and manner of one's own death" exists 
within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.8 The en bane court weighed this liberty interest against 
Washington's legitimate and countervailing state interests, and 
determined that the Washington statute is unconstitutional as 
it prohibits physicians from prescribing life-ending medication 
to terminally ill, mentally competent adults who choose to 
hasten their deaths.9 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. THE PLAINTIFFS 
The plaintiffs consisted of a non-profit organization called 
Compassion in Dying, five physicians, and three terminally ill 
patients. 1o Jane Roe was 69 years old and had been diagnosed 
3. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. 
Wash. 1994). The statute at issue in this case states: 
Promoting a suicide attempt. (1) A person is guilty of pro-
moting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or 
aids another person to attempt suicide. (2) Promoting a 
suicide is a Class C felony. 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988). 
4. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467. 
5. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 
1995) (opinion by Noonan, J., joined by O'Scannlain; dissent by Wright, J.). 
6. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995). 
7. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996), rev'g 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). 
8. [d. at *l. 
9. [d. 
10. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588-89 (9th Cir. 
2
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with cancer in 1988.11 Since June 1993, Ms. Roe had been 
bedridden.12 By November 1993, her life expectancy was less 
than six months. 13 At this point her doctor recommended she 
enter a hospice for care and comfort.14 Despite her physical 
1995). The appeal to the Ninth Circuit addressed only the claims by the three 
individual patients, and not by the physicians or the non-profit organization. [d. at 
590. 
Compassion in Dying is a non-profit organization specifically formed to as-
sist terminally ill, mentally competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths. 
Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1458 (W.D. 
Wash. 1994). It provides patients and their families free information, counseling, 
emotional support, and other means of assistance. [d. To ensure the correct deci-
sion by the patient, Compassion in Dying has very strict eligibility requirements 
for receiving assistance to die. [d. These requirements include: (1) The primary 
care· physician must judge that the patient is, indeed, terminally ill; (2) The pa-
tient must be capable of understanding his or her own decisions; (3) A mental 
health evaluation must be performed to prevent decisions motivated by depression, 
emotional distress, or other mental illness; (4) The request to die must not be the 
result of inadequate care, lack of health insurance, or other economic factors; (5) 
The patient personally must request to die. Compassion in Dying will not accept 
requests from family members or other people; however, the organization requires 
the approval of immediate family and close friends; (6) The patient must have 
requested assistance at least three times, with at least 48 hours between the 
second and the third requests; and (7) The patient's decision to hasten death must 
not be ambivalent or uncertain. [d. In addition, the organization requires its own 
physicians to review the patient's medical records and verify the patient's progno-
sis and decision-making capabilities. [d. 
The five physician-plaintiffs regularly treated terminally ill patients. [d. 
They each claim to have received requests from these patients for assistance in 
hastening death. [d. The physician-plaintiffs claim that sometimes their profession-
al judgment required them to provide this help. [d. However, they each specifically 
declared that the Washington statute had deterred them from doing so. [d. 
11. [d. at 1456. The patient-plaintiffs used pseudonyms to protect their priva-
cy. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 588. By the time this suit was flIed, Ms. 
Roe's cancer had spread throughout her entire body and she was in the last stage 
of the disease before death. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456. She had 
already undergone chemotherapy, radiation, and various other cancer treatments. 
[d. This produced little or no relief from the disease and the accompanying pain. 
[d. 
12. [d. In addition to pain, Ms. Roe also suffered from swollen legs, bed sores, 
poor appetite, nausea and vomiting, impaired vision, incontinence of bowel, and 
general weakness. [d. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. A hospice is a formal program of comfort care for persons in the last 
six months of life which provides pain management, symptom control, and family 
support. DEREK HUMPHRY, LAWFUL EXIT: THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM FOR HELP IN 
DYING 15 (1993). Comfort care measures do not attempt to treat the illness, but 
specifically attempt to relieve pain and discomfort in the last stages of a disease. 
[d. Comfort care is generally used either when a patient's traditional medical 
treatment is no longer effective, or when the burdens of a patient's illness out-
weigh the benefits of continued traditional medical treatment. TIMOTHY E. QUILL, 
3
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ailments and discomfort, Ms. Roe was mentally competent. 15 
She requested help from Compassion in Dying to hasten her 
death using prescription drugs. 1s Because of the Washington 
State statute, Compassion in Dying was unable to lawfully 
provide prescription drugs to help Ms. Roe die. 17 Ms. Roe 
eventually died prior to the district court's judgment in her 
case challenging the statute. 18 
John Doe, age 44, was dying of AIDS.19 At the time the 
complaint was filed in district court, he was in the terminal 
stage of his illness.20 He was mentally competent and wanted 
to hasten his death with doctor-prescribed drugs to prevent 
further and unnecessary pain.21 Because of the Washington 
State statute, Compassion in Dying could not lawfully provide 
Mr. Doe with this relief.22 Mr. Doe died of natural causes be-
fore the district court entered judgment.23 
James Poe was 69 years old and suffered from terminal 
chronic emphysema and heart disease.24 Mr. Poe required the 
assistance of an oxygen tank. to breathe.25 At the time this 
M.D., DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE 76 (1993). Some 
physicians oppose hospice care because an unintended shortening of the patient's 
life is a side effect of this program. [d. at 78. However, one advantage of comfort 
care is to humanize the process of dying by focusing on improving the quality of 
life, rather than the length of life. [d. In addition, comfort care procedures empha-
size the person, rather than the disease. [d. at 79. 
15. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456. 
16. [d. Ms. Roe complied with all Compassion in Dying's requirements. [d. See 
supra note 10 for a list of the requirements. 
17. See generally Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 
1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988). 
18. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
19. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456. Mr. Doe had been diagnosed 
in 1991 and had since suffered from pneumonia twice, chronic and severe skin and 
sinus infections, grand mal seizures, extreme fatigue, and cytomegalovirus retinitis 
resulting in blindness. [d. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. at 1456-57. Mr. Doe had previously witnessed the long, suffering deaths 
of both his companion from AIDS and his grandfather from diabetes. [d. at 1456. 
He wished to avoid such suffering himself. See id. 
22. See generally Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 
1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988). 
23. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 588. 
24. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1457. 
25. [d. Mr. Poe also had a constant sensation of suffocating and experienced 
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suit was filed, he was in the terminal stage of incurable pulmo-
nary and cardiac diseases.26 Mr. Poe was mentally competent 
and wanted to hasten his death through physician-prescribed 
drugS.27 Due to the Washington State statute, Compassion in 
Dying was not lawfully allowed to provide this.28 Mr. Poe 
lived to hear of the district court's judgment, but died of natu-
ral causes prior to the appeal before the three-judge panel of 
the Ninth Circuit.29 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Washing-
ton State statute as it applied to terminally ill, mentally com-
petent adults who specifically request a physician's assistance 
to hasten death.3o They sought declaratory judgment to ren-
der the statute unconstitutional for violating the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.31 
All plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.32 The district 
court denied the summary judgment motions for the physicians 
and for Compassion in Dying.33 However, the district court 
granted summary judgment for the patients, holding that the 
statute violated terminally ill, mentally competent adults' 
many panic attacks due to his inability to breathe. [d. In addition, his heart fail-
ure caused blockage of the blood flow to his extremities, resulting in severe leg 
pain. [d. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. 
Wash. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988). 
29. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
30. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988); Compassion in Dying, 
850 F. Supp. at 1455-56; Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 589; Compassion in 
Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 
6, 1996). 
31. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
32. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 589. 
33. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467. The district court did not ad-
dress the claims brought by Compassion in Dying and the physician-plaintiffs 
because these claims were not discussed in the briefs for the summary judgment 
motions. [d. Therefore, the court denied their motions. [d. This issue was not on 
appeal before the Ninth Circuit. See Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 589. 
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Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest to choose physician-
hastened death.34 In addition, the district court held that the 
statute violated the patient-plaintiffs' right to equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment because it prohibits physi-
cian-hastened death but permits withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment from substantially similarly situated patients.36 
Relying on two landmark Supreme Court cases, Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey36 and 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health,37 the district 
court held that the patient-plaintiffs had a fundamental liberty 
interest in "the freedom to make choices according to one's 
individual conscience about those matters which are essential 
to personal autonomy and basic human dignity. "38 The district 
court also held that the undue burden standard cited in Casey 
was the appropriate test to use in weighing this fundamental 
right against the state's interests.39 After examining the 
state's interests and whether there was a substantial obstacle 
to the patient-plaintiffs, the district court concluded that the 
statute placed an undue burden on their rights.40 In addition, 
the district court ruled that the statute violated the patient-
plaintiffs' rights to equal protection, as contrasted with the 
34. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467. 
35. [d. 
36. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
37. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
38. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461. 
39. [d. at 1462-63. The majority in Casey held that the correct test for a facial 
constitutional challenge to abortion regulations was whether the "state regulation 
imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to [choose whether to have an 
abortion)". Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819. Specifically, Casey held that "a finding of an 
undue burden is shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the pur-
pose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus." [d. at 2820 (emphasis added). The district court 
used the undue burden standard set out in Casey because a majority of the Casey 
Court agreed that this standard is the "standard of general application to which 
we intend to adhere". Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1463 (quoting Casey, 
112 S. Ct. at 2820). The Casey Court held that the undue burden standard is "the 
appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the . . . right 'to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters . . . fundamentally affecting 
a person.m Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819-20 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 453 (1972». The district court found that Compassion in Dying concerns the 
same liberty interest, thereby holding that the undue burden standard is to be 
used here as well as in the abortion cases. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 
1463-64. 
40. [d. at 1465. 
6
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right of terminally ill patients in Washington to request with-
drawal of life-sustaining equipment.41 The statute at issue 
prevents patients in substantially the same situation from 
using other means to hasten their deaths.42 
The State of Washington appealed the district court's 
grant of summary judgment for the patient-plaintiffs to the 
Ninth Circuit.43 A Ninth Circuit three-judge panel considered 
the appeal, and reversed the district court's decision.44 The 
Ninth Circuit then granted en bane review.45 Shortly before 
publication of this note, the en bane court issued its opinion 
reversing the three-judge panel and affirming the district 
court's holding.46 With this decision, the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized a constitutional liberty interest in determining the time 
and manner of one's own death.47 
41. [d. at 1467. Washington State permits the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment from terminally ill patients, even if this withdrawal results in death. 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1995). In addition, Washing-
ton State does not hold the physician culpable for these deaths. WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 70.122.051 (West Supp. 1995). 
Section 70.122.030(1), states in part: 
[d. 
A:ny adult person may execute a directive directing the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in 
a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition. 
Section 70.122.051, provides that: 
[d. 
A:ny physician, health care provider acting under the 
direction of a physician, or health facility and its person-
nel who participate in good faith in the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a qualified 
patient in accordance with the requirements of this chap-
ter, shall be immune from legal liability, including civil, 
criminal, or professional conduct sanctions, unless other-
wise negligent. 
42. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467. 
43. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
44. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
45. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995). 
46. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). 
47. [d. at *1. This note discusses the reversal of the three-judge panel decision 
by the en bane court. 
7
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. BASIS OF THE CONTROVERSY 
Euthanasia was an accepted practice in ancient Greece 
and Rome.48 The term "euthanasia" derived from the Greek 
language.49 Ancient medical ethics required physicians to alle-
viate the patient's suffering, to lessen the violence of disease, 
and to refuse to treat those who were overwhelmed by their 
diseases. 50 The physicians knew that medicine was often pow-
erless.51 Therefore, they had a duty to treat only those pa-
tients they could help, and not those patients they could not 
help.52 
Controversy over euthanasia dates back at least as far as 
the beginnings of Christianity.53 In the second and third cen-
48. Wendy N. Weigand, Has the Time Come for Doctor Death: Should Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide be Legalized?, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 321, n.3 (1992-1993) (citing 
Abigail Trafford, Society's View of Suicide, THE WASHINGTON POST, August 20, 
1991, at Zll). Euthanasia is a deliberate life-shortening act administered on an 
incurable patient in such a patient's interest, intending to create a quick, peaceful 
death. DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN WICKETT, THE RIGHT TO DIE: UNDERSTANDING 
EUTHANASIA 303 (1986). 
Seneca, the famed Roman Stoic philosopher, hastened his death because he 
was simply ready to die. Weigand, supra, at 321, n.3 (citing Trafford, supra, at 
Zll). 
It makes a great deal of difference whether a man is 
lengthening his life or his death. But if the body is use-
less for service, why should one not free the struggling 
soul? Perhaps one ought to do this a little before the debt 
is due, lest, when it falls due, he may be unable to per-
form the act. 
[d. at 325 (quoting JERRY B. WILSON, DEATH By DECISION: THE MEDICAL, MORAL, 
AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA 22 (1975) (citing SENECA, EPISTULAE Mo-
RALES, Vol I, lvii 32-36, at 407-9». 
49. Weigand, supra note 48, at 322. "Eu" translates as "well" or "good"; 
"thanos" translates as "death." [d. 
50. [d. at 324. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. (citing WILSON, supra note 48, at 19). "It is safe to say that a physi-
cian who prolonged the life of a person who could not ultimately recover his or 
her health was considered to be acting unethically." Weigand, supra note 48, at 
325 (quoting Darrell W. Amundsen, History of Medical Ethics: Ancient Greece and 
Rome, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 930, 934 (1978) (citing PLATO, REpUBLIC 
406A; DEMOSTHENES, THIRD OLYNTHIAC 33; PLUTARCH, MORALIA, 23(A»). 
53. See HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 5-7. 
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turies, Christians viewed all forms of euthanasia as suicide. 54 
The Catholic Church advanced the belief that suicide was a 
mortal sin, equivalent to murder.55 Suicide was considered to 
violate the strict interpretation of the Sixth Commandment of 
the Bible as it left no time for the "sinner" to repent. 56 Histor-
ically, Christians believed that God alone may determine when 
a person shall die.57 This Christian view influenced church 
law, as well as secular law.58 
In 1957, Pope Pius XII announced that a member of the 
Catholic Church need only accept ordinary medical treatments, 
and not extraordinary medical treatments to uphold the 
faith. 59 Therefore, if a person survives only with the help of 
extraordinary means, Catholic policy allows these means to be 
removed, even if it results in death.60 In addition, the Pope 
allowed one to receive large doses of drugs to relieve unbear-
able pain for patients with incurable cancer, even if the drugs 
shortened that patient's life.61 However, this practice was ac-
54. Id. at 6. 
55. Mark D. Frederick, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Personal Right?, 21 S.U. 
L. REv. 59, 63 (1994) (citing A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF SUICIDE 4-26 (S. 
Perlin ed., 1975». 
56. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 7. The Sixth Commandment 
states, "Thou shalt not kill." EXQdus 20:13. The Bible does not specifically prohibit 
or condemn suicide; it merely describes suicide in general terms. Frederick, supra 
note 55, at 63. 
57. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 6. The prescribed Catholic stance 
on euthanasia is: "Only God has the right to take away the life of the innocent, 
and human suffering has a special value." Id. at 51 (quoting Gerald Kelly, Medico-
Moral Problems, HOSPITAL PROGRESS, March 1950, Vol. 31, No.3, at 91). 
58. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 5-6. Early church law dictated 
that if one committed "self-murder" then that person would not be given a Chris-
tian burial. Id. at 6. Civil penalties included confiscating the person's goods and 
property to the detriment of the survivors and an ignominious burial on the high-
way, impaled by a stake. Id. 
59. Id. at 195-96. Gerald Kelly, of the Society for Jesuit, defined ordinary 
means as all medicines, treatments, and operations "which offer a reasonable hope 
of benefit for the patient and which can be obtained and used without excessive 
expense, pain, or other inconvenience." Id. at 196 (quoting GERALD KELLY, MEDI-
CO-MORAL PROBLEMS 129 (1958». Extraordinary means are those which "cannot be 
obtained or used without excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience, or which, 
if used would not offer reasonable hope of benefit." Id. (quoting KELLY, supra, at 
129). 
60. See HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 196. 
61. Id. at 52. This so-called "double-effect" is the unintended shortening of a 
patient's life as a potential side effect for pain relief treatment. QUILL, supra note 
14, at 78. 
9
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ceptable to the Catholic religion only if no direct causal link 
between the death and the will of the interested parties exist-
ed.62 In other words, the Pope accepted passive euthanasia in 
limited circumstances, but continued to denounce active eutha-
nasia.63 
The traditional Judeo-Christian belief in the sanctity of 
life is based on beliefs in God and that life has a purpose.54 
The Judeo-Christian influence on law and ethics has survived 
throughout the years.65 Laws against assisted death are root-
ed in religious origins.66 However, neither such laws nor the 
62. HUMPHRY & WICKETI, supra note 48, at 52. As long as the primary pur-
pose of the treatment was to relieve suffering, the double effect of pain relief and 
death absolved the physician from responsibility for indirectly contributing to the 
patient's death. QUILL, supra note 14, at 78. This also absolved the Catholic doctor 
or patient from committing a "sin". See HUMPHRY & WICKETI, supra note 48, at 
52. 
63. [d. at 288. "Passive suicide" or "passive euthanasia" has been defined as 
the deliberate disconnection of life support equipment, or cessation of any medical 
procedure, permitting the death of a patient. HUMPHRY, supra note 14, at 12. 
"Active euthanasia" has been defined as the action of one person directly helping 
another to die on request, such as injecting the patient with medication intended 
to hasten death. [d. "Assisted suicide" has been defined as providing the means by 
which a person can take his or her own life, such as a doctor giving the patient a 
prescription for medication intended to hasten death. [d. "Self-deliverance" has 
been defined as an irreversibly ill person making a rational decision to end his or 
her own life. [d. 
In addition to Catholicism, most other Christian religions currently do not 
oppose passive euthanasia because simply removing extraordinary medical means 
may be viewed as a natural death and, therefore, part of God's will. HUMPHRY & 
WICKETI, supra note 48, at 288. Judaism also allows passive, or "indirect," eutha-
nasia as long as the patient's death is merely the unpremeditated result of some 
medication given to relieve pain or is a consequence of withdrawal of medical 
treatment. [d. at 289 (citing RABBI IMMANUEL JAKOBOVITS, JEWISH MEDICAL ETH-
ICS: A COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE JEWISH RELIGIOUS ATIlTUDES 
TO MEDICINE AND ITS PRACTICE 345 (1959». 
64. See supra text accompanying notes 53-63. 
65. See Frederick, supra note 55, at 63. See also HUMPHRY & WICKETI, supra 
note 48, at 218. Courts have generally disregarded using humane motive and the 
patient's terminal condition as factors in mercy killing cases, reflecting the "sancti-
ty of life" tradition. HUMPHRY & WICKETI, supra note 48, at 218. "[C]onsent of the 
deceased is not a defense in a prosecution for homicide. The right of life and per-
sonal security is not only sacred ... it is inalienable." Martin v. Commonwealth, 
37 S.E.2d 43, 47 (Va. 1946) (quoting 26 AM. JUR. Homicide § 103). "One who 
commits euthanasia bears no ill will toward his victim and believes his act is 
morally justified, but he nonetheless acts with malice if he is able to comprehend 
that society prohibits his act regardless of his personal belief." People v. Conley, 
411 P.2d 911, 918 (Cal. 1966) (emphasis added). 
66. See Frederick, supra note 55, at 59; Weigand, supra note 48, at 326; 
10
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opponents of euthanasia acknowledge that people of other 
religions and non-believers may have rights and beliefs as 
well.67 
B. MODERN HISTORY 
The New Jersey Supreme Court first allowed the with-
drawal of treatment from an incompetent patient in In re 
Quinlan.68 The court noted that the United States Supreme 
Court found the constitutional right of privacy to exist in the 
"penumbra of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.,,69 
Applying the United States Supreme Court's recognition that a 
personal privacy right exists and that the Constitution guaran-
tees certain areas of privacy, the Quinlan court expanded the 
privacy right to encompass a patient's decision to decline medi-
cal treatment.70 
The Quinlan court held that the state's interest in preserv-
ing life weakens, while the patient's right to privacy grows, "as 
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis 
dims.'>7l The New Jersey Supreme Court held that Ms. 
HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 5-7. 
67. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 48, at 165. 
68. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). Ms. Quinlan had stopped breathing resulting in 
coma and decortication, a condition relating to derangement of the brain's cortex. 
[d. at 654. She required a respirator to breathe. [d. Her doctor testified that she 
remained in a coma from the time that she arrived at the hospital, and character-
ized her as being in a "chronic, persistent vegetative state" with no cognitive func-
tion. [d. However, the doctors did not consider this condition brain dead. [d. 
69. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
484 (1965». 
70. [d. at 663-64 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969». The Quinlan court likened this right to that of a 
woman's right to choose an abortion. [d. at 663 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
153 (1973». The Massachusetts Supreme Court has also held such a privacy inter-
est exists: 
The right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression 
of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determi-
nation as fundamental constituents of life. The value of 
life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision to refuse 
treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human 
being the right of choice. 
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 
(Mass. 1977). 
71. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664. 
11
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Quinlan's interest in being free of bodily invasion outweighed 
the state's interest in preserving her life.72 
The Quinlan decision has had a profound effect on "living 
will" legislation in many states other than New Jersey, as well 
as on public opinion.73 In addition, this case affected case law 
in other jurisdictions, such as Massachusetts, where the Su-
preme Court held that a terminally ill, incompetent patient 
has a right to have invasive medical treatment withdrawn, 
even if the withdrawal of treatment will result in death.74 
Further, Washington State has extended this concept to allow 
withdrawal of artificial means of nutrition and hydration.75 
72. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Court has since held a state's interests 
against euthanasia are: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the inter-
ests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining 
the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426. 
73. HUMPHRY & WICKE'IT, supra note 48, at 108-14. A living will is an ad-
vance directive that provides specific instructions about health care treatment. 
QUILL, supra note 14, at 224. In particular, it reflects the patient's wishes to re-
fuse, or to retain, life-sustaining treatment if the patient becomes incompetent in 
the future. Id. The will is "living" in the sense that it is activated when a person 
loses mental capacity but remains alive. Id. at 190. 
In 1977, one year after the Quinlan decision, fifty living will bills were 
introduced in thirty-eight state legislatures. HUMPHRY & WICKE'IT, supra note 48, 
at 108. Eight states signed them into law. Id. This is compared to only five states 
introducing such bills before 1975. Id. In addition, just prior to the Quinlan deci-
sion, only seventeen bills were introduced and none were signed into law. Id. 
Furthermore, before 1975, the Euthanasia Education Council satisfied 750,000 
requests for its sample version of a living will, as compared to 1.25 million re-
quests in the year and a half after Quinlan. Id. at 114. 
74. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 
(Mass. 1977). The facts of Saikewicz differ from Quinlan in two respects: (1) 
Saikewicz concerned a terminally ill patient as opposed to one in a persistent 
vegetative state, and (2) the patient in Saikewicz was severely mentally retarded 
(therefore, he was never competent) as opposed to one who had become incompe-
tent. Id. at 420-21. Despite these differences, the court still held that a constitu-
tional right to privacy exists which encompasses "an expression of the sanctity of 
individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life." 
Id. at 426. In addition, the court indicated that, like in Quinlan, as the patient's 
prognosis decreases, the state's interest in preserving that life weakens. Id. at 425-
26. 
75. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 454 (Wash. 1987). "The right 
to have life-sustaining treatment withheld extends to all artificial procedures which 
serve only to prolong the life of a terminally ill patient." Id. The court deferred to 
the legislature to address assisted suicide. Id. at 455. The resulting statute, WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988), is at issue in Compassion in Dying v. 
State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). 
The Washington Supreme Court held that Washington State's interests 
against euthanasia are: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of interests 
12
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The United States Supreme Court, in Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Dep't of Health, found that a constitutionally protect-
ed liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment 
exists.76 The Court stated that one has the right to refuse 
artificial life-saving nutrition and hydration.77 Therefore, the 
right to refuse medical treatment exists even if exercising that 
right results in death.78 However, the Court specifically left 
open the question of whether the Constitution also permits 
physician-assisted death, thereby not foreclosing the existence 
of this right.79 In addition, the Court acknowledged that "[t]he 
choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of 
obvious and overwhelming finality."80 
Public perception of euthanasia has changed over time. A 
1991 opinion poll sponsored by the Boston Globe and Harvard 
School of Public Health showed that 64% of Americans favor 
access to physician-assisted death for terminally ill patients.81 
In 1988, the San Francisco Medical Society surveyed its physi-
cian-members and found that 70% of the 676 respondents 
of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of 
the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Grant, 747 P.2d at 451 (citing In re 
: Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983». In addition, the court held that "the amount 
of pain endured by a dying patient is a significant factor to be considered [when 
deciding whether the right to withhold life-sustaining treatment can attach]. . . . 
The individual's right to die with dignity must not be ignored." Id. at 450-51. 
76. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). 
Washington State permits terminally ill patients to refuse medical treatment even 
if this refusal will result in death. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West 
Supp. 1995). In addition, any physician who refrains from treating a patient, ac-
cording to that patient's wishes, will not be prosecuted even in the event of that 
patient's death. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.051 (West Supp. 1995). 
77. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. 
78. See id. See also Victoria L. Helms, Assisted Suicide: Giving Meaning to the 
Right to Die, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 173 (1993). 
79. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-78. "[I]n deciding 'a question of such magnitude 
and importance ... it is the [better] part of wisdom not to attempt, by any gen-
eral statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject.'" Id. (quoting Twin 
City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897». Therefore, the Court has not 
denied that an individual's right to privacy may include physician-assisted death. 
Frederick, supra note 55, at 88. 
80. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. The United States Supreme Court has since held 
that deeply personal choices are within the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty inter-
est. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 
2807 (1992). One such choice is the choice between life and death, as acknowl-
edged by the Cruzan Court. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. 
81. Weigand, supra note 48, at 342 (citing Richard A. Knox, Poll: Americans 
Favor Mercy Killing, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1991, at 1). 
13
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agreed that terminally ill patients should have the option of 
requesting active euthanasia.82 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. DUE PROCESS 
In its analysis of Compassion in Dying v. State of Wash-
ington, the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that no 
constitutional right to "aid in killing oneself' exists under the 
United States Constitution.83 The three-judge panel disagreed 
with the district court's use of Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey84 to assert a right to die.85 It 
82. Steve Heilig, The SFMS Euthanasia Survey: Results and Analyses, SAN 
FRANCISCO MEDICINE, May 1988, at 24. This change in attitude may be attributed 
in part to the media's coverage of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, who has assisted several 
patients to die. See Weigand, supra note 48, at 331-32. However, while Dr. 
Kevorkian may think that his publicity will increase public favor for physician-
assisted death, his methods may actually hamper euthanasia advocates' efforts to 
legalize this practice. See QUILL, supra note 14, at 153. In 1991, Washington 
State's Initiative 119, which would have legalized physician-assisted death for 
terminally ill, mentally competent patients, lost by a 54 to 46 percent margin. 1d. 
at 152-53. During the week before the vote, Dr. Kevorkian assisted two more 
deaths, which may have enhanced Washington voters' fears about adequate safe-
guards and the potential for abuse. 1d. at 153. In addition, Dr. Kevorkian's actions 
have precipitated Michigan's ban on physician-assisted death. Weigand, supra note 
48, at 333, n.73. 
Dr. Kevorkian has been admired by many for his principles regarding physi-
cian-assisted death. DEREK HUMPHRY, DYING WITH DIGNITY: UNDERSTANDING Eu-
THANASIA 40 (1992). However, his well-publicized actions, his brief acquaintance 
with his patients before they die, and his disregard for the law have all earned 
him severe criticism. HUMPHRY, supra note 14, at 23. Some specific criticisms of 
Dr. Kevorkian include: (1) that he does not have the knowledge or experience to 
ensure that all alternative medical approaches have been exhausted, or that the 
patient's wish to die is not based upon depression; (2) that he has not developed a 
deep or long-standing relationship with the patient; (3) that he has not researched 
all information about the irreversibility of each patient's illness or about comfort 
care measures; (4) that he has assisted patients whose medical conditions have 
been ambiguous and uncertain; and (5) that he has used the deaths to gain pub-
licity to promote his own ideas about death. QUILL, supra note 14, at 124-25. 
83. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590, 591 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
84. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Freedom to make choices according to one's indi-
vidual conscience about those matters which are essential to personal autonomy 
and basic human dignity, including a woman's choice to have an abortion, is a 
fundamental liberty interest. 1d. 
85. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590. Specifically, the district court held 
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found that the district court used Casey's language out of con-
text, stating that Casey applies only to regulating abortion and 
does not create a right to commit suicide.86 Therefore, the dis-
trict court had made an "enormous leap" in holding that such a 
there is a "right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and the mystery of human life." Compassion in Dying v. State of Washing-
ton, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 
2801). 
86. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590. The Casey language referred to is: 
[M]atters . . . involving the most intimate and personal . 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central 
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liber-
ty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart 
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define 
the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State. 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807. 
Throughout Compassion in Dying, the three-judge panel used the terms 
"killing oneself' and "suicide," rather than "assisted death" or "self-deliverance." 
See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). 
"Suicide" can be defined as an irrational decision to cause one's own death, due to 
emotional or psychological pressures. See HUMPHRY, supra note 14, at 12-13. Advo-
cates of the right to assisted death claim this term is inaccurate and unfair. Id. at 
12. "Self-deliverance" is defined as the rational decision by a terminally ill patient 
to end one's own life. Id. Patient-plaintiffs argued that the term "suicide" is an 
inaccurate characterization of a terminally ill patient's decision to hasten his or 
her death. Brief of Appellees at 6-7, n.5, Compassion in Dying v. State of Wash-
ington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.) (No. 94-35534) (1995). 
I find it appalling that the pejorative label "suicide" 
would be put on a terminally ill person's choice to hasten 
his or her inevitable death. In no meaningful sense of the 
term can a choice to hasten one's own inevitable death by 
the use of physician-prescribed medications be labeled a 
"suicide." ... The terminally ill person, who is facing 
death, and who seeks to have the choice to hasten that 
inevitable death, is not "committing suicide" by ending a 
life that otherwise is of indefinite duration. The life of the 
terminally ill person is coming to an end, and the ques-
tion is whether the terminally ill person must undergo 
unbearable suffering until death comes "naturally", or 
whether that person can make the choice to end the un-
bearable suffering by the use of physician-prescribed medi-
cations. 
Id. at 7, n.5 (quoting Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Hastening Ineuitable 
Death, HAsTINGS CENTER REP., Sep.-Oct. 1993, at 20, 22). See also Leslie Bender, 
A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Voluntary Actiue Euthanasia, 
59 TENN. L. REV. 519, 527-30 (1992). "When we call doctors' actions 'aiding sui-
cide,' 'euthanasia,' or 'killing,' we prefigure the ensuing debate. These labels carry 
pejorative baggage." [d. at 527-28. 
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right exists.87 However, the en bane opinion relied heavily on 
Casey and the abortion cases to find a due process liberty in-
terest in determining the time and manner of one's own 
death.as 
The three-judge panel opinion implied that the panel did 
not wish to extend due process rights to previously unarticulat-
ed circumstances.89 The opinion explained that if the district 
court's assertion was correct, it would lead to absurd results.90 
Specifically, the three-judge panel stated that if a right to 
assistance in suicide truly exists, then this right would apply 
to every "sane" adult regardless of physical illness.91 Restrict-
ing its application only to the terminally ill would be "illuso-
ry. "92 Therefore, the three-judge panel held that the proposed 
constitutional right cannot be restricted at all.93 The en bane 
court, however, clearly limited its holding to terminally ill, 
87. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590. 
88. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848, at *7-8, 18-19 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). The en bane court examined the 
compelling similarities between right-to-die cases and abortion cases. ld. at *7. 
First, "In the former as in the latter, the relative strength of the competing inter-
ests changes as physical, medical, or related circumstances vary." ld. Second, 
"Equally important, both types of cases raises issues of life and death, and both 
arouse similar religious and moral concerns. Both present basic questions about an 
individual's right of choice." ld. 
The en bane court stated that the fundamental message of Casey regarding 
the issue in the present case is: "These matters, involving the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to person digni-
ty and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." ld. at *8 (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807). The en bane court stated 
that a patient's decision whether to endure or avoid unrelieved misery and torture 
"constitutes one of the most, if not the most, 'intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime,' a choice that is 'central to personal dignity and 
autonomy.' Surely such a decision implicates a most vital liberty interest." ld. at 
*19 (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807). 
89. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591. The three-judge panel stated that 
since no court had ever specifically held that a constitutional right to "aid in kill-
ing oneself' exists, it would not and should not "invent a constitutional right un-
known to the past and antithetical to the defense of human life that has been a 
chief responsibility of our constitutional government." ld. 
90.ld. 
91. ld. 
92. ld. The three-judge panel did not provide legal authority or analysis for 
holding that constitutional rights cannot be narrowly tailored to a certain group to 
which that right applies. See' id. 
93. ld. at 590. 
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mentally competent adults who wish to hasten their own 
deaths.94 
Next, the three-judge panel explained that the Supreme 
Court's holding in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of 
Health95 does not extend to a terminally ill patient's right to 
gain assistance in suicide.96 Therefore, the three-judge panel 
denied that a right to choose to die exists because the district 
court lacked a basis in precedent to assert this right.97 In con-
trast, the en bane court found that Cruzan, by acknowledging a 
liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining nutrition and hydra-
tion, even when this refusal results in death, necessarily recog-
nizes a liberty interest in hastening one's own death.98 
Further, the three-judge panel held that a right-to-die 
lacks foundation in American tradition and history because no 
court has ever upheld a right to aid in killing oneself.99 Again, 
94. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848, at *5, n.9 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). "Declaring a statute unconstitutional as 
applied to members of a group is atypical but not uncommon." [d. (citing Tennes-
see v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 
(1972». 
95. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
96. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 59l. Cruzan held that "the United States 
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to 
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition", even at risk of death. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 
at 279. The three-judge panel in Compassion in Dying reasoned that Cruzan ap-
plied only to a patient's limited right to refuse medical treatment and that this 
right is not synonymous with a right to actively kill oneself. Compassion in Dying, 
49 F.3d at 591. The three-judge panel stated this difference was due to the fact 
that the majority of states have imposed criminal liability on those who assist an-
other to commit suicide. [d. However, it did not acknowledge that the very issue 
in this case is whether those criminal sanctions in the context at issue are consti-
tutional. See id. 
97. [d. 
98. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *20. 
99. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 59l. Patient-plaintiffs argued that there 
is a right to choose to die, which includes a right to assistance in effecting that 
choice. Brief of Appellees, at 14, n.12, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washing-
ton, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.) (No. 94-35534) (1995). This is similar to a woman 
having the right to assistance in having an abortion, rather than forcing the wom-
an to perform her abortion herself. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). They 
contend, therefore, that a physician's assistance is necessary to the exercise of a 
terminally ill patient's right to choose to hasten death. Brief of Appellees, at 14, 
n.12, Compassion in Dying (No. 94-35534). 
The alternatives are violent suicide - horrific and almost 
unimaginable for a nondisturbed person - or an unassist-
17
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the en bane court disagreed, considering American tradition 
and history more broadly to find that "the relevant historical 
record is far more checkered than the majority [of the three-
judge panel] would have us believe."lOo The en bane court also 
stated that the three-judge panel erred by concluding that a 
historical analysis alone is a sufficient basis to reject the 
plaintiffs' claim to a liberty interest. 101 
ed attempt with poison or drugs that have not been pre-
scribed specifically for this purpose. The undisputed record 
shows that terminally ill persons who seek to hasten 
death need medical counseling regarding the type of drugs 
and the amount and manner in which they should be 
taken, as well as a prescription, which only a doctor can 
provide. Attempts to hasten death without such advice 
.frequently fail, often leaving the patient in worse shape 
than before or succeed only after terrible pain and suffer-
ing. The emotional and psychological effect on terminally 
ill persons of their inability to obtain assistance from 
their physicians can be devastating; patients feel aban-
doned by their physicians when most in need of help. 
Id. (citations omitted). See generally QUILL, supra note 14. 
Washington law already allows terminally ill patients to end their lives 
without any assistance by allowing the patient to choose to cease medical treat-
ment. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1995). In addition, 
suicide and attempted suicide, even for mentally unstable individuals, are not 
crimes in Washington. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 
1454, 1464, n.9 (W.O. Wash. 1994). Washington also absolves doctors and health 
care workers from civil, criminal, and professional conduct liability when assisting 
a terminally ill person to withdraw treatment. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 
70.122.051 (West Supp. 1995). Therefore, Washington already recognizes the need 
for physician assistance in carrying out the patient's right to hasten death. See id. 
100. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *13. 
101. Id. at *12. The en bane court cited Loving v. Virginia as an example of 
the Supreme Court finding a substantive due process right to exist, despite the 
fact that anti-miscegenation laws were commonplace in our nation's history. Id. 
(citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967». 
It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm 
of personal liberty which the government may not enter. 
We have vindicated this principle before. Marriage is 
mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial 
marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century, 
but the Court was no doubt correct in finding it to be an 
aspect of liberty protected against state interference by 
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause in 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) .... Similar ex-
amples may be found in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
94-99 (1987) ... ; in Carey v. Population Service Interna-
tional, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) . . . ; in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965). 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805 (parallel citations omitted). 
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Rather than analyzing the district court's usage of the 
undue burden standard of review, the three-judge panel ap-
plied the rigid standard used in United States v. Salerno. 102 
Salerno states that to facially challenge a statute based on 
constitutionality, the challengers "must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be val-
id."103 Using the Salerno test, the three-judge panel pointed 
out that the statute is constitutional in some circumstances, 
such as the prevention of teenage suicides or fraud upon the 
elderly.104 Therefore, the three-judge panel held that the stat-
ute is not facially unconstitutional under the Salerno stan-
dard. l05 
The en bane court did not rely on the undue burden stan-
dard nor the strict Salerno standard.106 Instead, the en bane 
court found that in substantive due process cases, a balancing 
test is the appropriate analysis. l07 The en bane court declined 
to adopt either the two-tier or three-tier tests, depending on 
the classification of the right. lOS Rather, the en bane court 
adopted a continuum approach, wherein the more important 
the individual right or interest, the more persuasive the justifi-
cation for governmental infringement would need to be.109 Al-
though the en bane court declined to definitively classify the 
right at issue as fundamental or merely important, it made 
102. 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591. See supra 
note 39 for an explanation of the undue burden standard used in Casey. 
103. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745). 
104. [d. 
105. [d. 
106. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848, at *5, n.9 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). 
107. [d. at *5. "Whether [the individual's] constitutional rights have been violat-
ed must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state 
interests." [d. (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 
279 (1990) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982»). See also Mills 
v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982). The Cruzan Court also noted that the balanc-
ing test is deeply rooted in this nation's legal traditions, noting that it has been 
used in substantive due process cases at least since 1905. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 
(citing Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). In 1905, the Supreme Court 
balanced an individual's liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine 
against the state's interest in preventing disease. Jacobsen, 197 U.S. 11. 
108. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *11. 
109. [d. 
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"one point. .. absolutely clear: there can be no legitimate 
argument that rational basis review is applicable."uo 
Weighing Washington's interests against the individual's 
decision to die, the three-judge panel decided the state has 
certain interests which outweigh an individual's choice to 
die. 111 The three-judge panel acknowledged the interests as: 
110. Id. 
1. Preserving the integrity of the physician's 
professional ethics as perceived by the physician 
and by not having physicians in the role of "kill-
ers of their patients. "112 
The three-judge panel suggested that physi-
cians might begin to think. that killing patients 
is an acceptable alternative to curing or treating 
the patient, especially if there is no known cure 
for the patient's disorder.113 
2. Protecting the elderly or infirm from psy-
chological pressure to consent to their own 
111. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591-93 (9th Cir. 
1995). The three-judge panel listed these interests based on two task force reports, 
cited by appellants and amici in their appellate briefs to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 
591-92. These reports are New York State Task Force, When Death is Sought: 
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context, 1994 and Michigan Com-
mission on Death and Dying, Final Report, 1994. Id. 
Governor Cuomo commissioned the New York task force in 1985. Id. at 592. 
Twenty-four members represented ethical, religious, legal, and medical views. Id. 
"Respect for individual choice and self-determination has served as a touchstone 
for public policies about medical decisions over the past two decades." Brief of 
Appellees at 27, n.29, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 
(9th Cir.) (No. 94-35534) (1995) (quoting NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, WHEN 
DEATH IS SOUGHT: AsSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 1 
(1994». Because of this policy, a number of the task force members believed that 
for terminally ill, mentally competent individuals, assistance in dying would be 
proper and ethical. Id. at 15, n.13 (citing NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra, at 
120, 140). However, these members still voted against recommending legislative 
reform for fear that ineligible individuals would improperly choose this option. Id. 
(citing NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra, at 120, 140). 
The Michigan commission started in 1992. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 
592. It agreed by majority vote to recommend legislative change in the Michigan 
law against assisted death. Id. However, the commission did not challenge the 
constitutionality of the existing Michigan legislation. Id. Neither of the task force 
reports were provided to the district court. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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deaths. U4 
The three-judge panel anticipated that 
physicians might seek out the best candidates 
for suicide and that some patients would feel 
compelled to agree to their doctor's recommenda-
tion.u5 
3. Preventing exploitation of minorities and 
the poor. U6 
The three-judge panel reasoned that due to 
economic circumstances, minorities and the poor 
have fewer options in treatment and the allevia-
tion of pain. 117 Therefore, they may be more 
likely to desire suicide.uB The three-judge pan-
el stated that the patients may choose to reduce 
the cost of treatment by quickly terminating life 
to avoid a prolonged illness. U9 
4. Protecting people with disabilities from 
societal indifference and antipathy.120 
The three-judge panel stated that the public 
would create and strengthen the stereotype that 
seriously disabled people should want to die, and 
that the disabled person would begin to believe 
this stereotype, thereby creating the desire to 
commit suicide. 121 
5. Preventing physician or patient abuse of 
the right to die. 122 
116. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. 
21 
119. [d. "[T]he cost of treatment is viewed as relevant to decisions at the bed-
side." [d. (quoting NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 111, at 129). The 
three-judge panel reasoned that reducing the treatment of treatable illnesses in the 
poor would make them the "primest candidates for . . . physician-recommended 
suicide." [d. (emphasis added). The three-judge panel did not acknowledge that the 
issue in this case regards only patients who are not treatable and who have cho-
sen, through their own decision, not their physician's recommendation, to hasten 
their inevitable deaths. See id. 
120. [d. at 592-93. 
121. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592-93. However, the three-judge panel 
did not acknowledge that this case only regards terminally ill patients and not 
those with disabilities. See id. 
122. [d. at 593. In explaining this interest, the three-judge panel only cited 
21
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The state interests identified by the en bane court in part 
overlapped with those previously cited by the Washington 
Supreme Court,123 and included: (1) preserving life; (2) pre-
venting suicide; (3) avoiding the involvement of third parties 
and in precluding the uses of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influ-
ence; (4) protecting family members and loved ones; (5) protect-
ing the integrity of the medical profession; and (6) avoiding 
adverse consequences.124 Weighing these interests against an 
individual's liberty interest, the en bane court identified rele-
vant factors necessary to consider in balancing. 125 After care-
fully considering each state interest in light of these factors, 
and conceding the importance of many of the state interests, 
the en bane court nonetheless found that the state interests 
simply do not outweigh the strong liberty interest at stake.126 
minimal statistics available from the Netherlands where physician-assisted death 
for terminally ill, mentally competent patients is not criminalized. See id. The 
three-judge panel announced that, in 1990, 1.8 percent of all deaths in the Neth-
erlands resulted from patient-requested death and that an additional 0.8 percent of 
all deaths resulted without a contemporaneous request to end the patient's life. Id. 
(citing NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note Ill, at 133-34). However, these 
are the only statistics cited by the three-judge panel in support of the interest 
against abuse. See id. at 593. It did not discuss whether these statistics are signif-
icant nor whether they even reflect an abuse of one's right to choose to die. See 
id. 
A study of the Netherlands' physician-assisted death practices shows that in 
half the cases where the assisted death did not comply with the Netherlands' 
criteria for consent, the patient had previously expressed a wish to die, but be-
came incompetent before being able to give a valid request. QUILL, supra note 14, 
at 149. In addition, many of the unconsented deaths resulted from the "double 
effect" of administering pain medication, which happened to result in death. Id. 
Overall, there is not enough data to accurately judge whether these statistics rep-
resent abuse at all; however, the study suggests that abuse of physician-assisted 
death occurred less frequently than speculated and the vast majority of patients 
died within accepted guidelines. Id. at 150. 
123. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (Wash. 1987); In re Colyer, 
660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983). See infra text at note 173 for a list of the articu-
lated interests, and text and accompanying notes 178-197 for a discussion of these 
interests. 
124. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848, at *21-33 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). 
125. Id. at *21. These factors include: (1) the importance of the various state 
interests, both in general and in the factual context of the case; (2) the manner in 
which those interests are furthered by the state law or regulation; (3) the impor-
tance of the liberty interest, both in itself and in the context in which it is being 
exercised; (4) the extent to which that interest is burdened by the challenged state 
action; and (5) the consequences of upholding or overturning the statute or regula-
tion. Id. 
126. Id. at *21-33. 
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In addition, the en bane court identified safeguards that could 
be taken to minimize the risks advanced by the state.127 
The three-judge panel criticized the scope of the district 
court judgment as being indefinite.128 It first stated that if 
the right to die is a liberty interest under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be applicable to 
all "sane" adults, not just those who are terminally ill. 129 
Therefore, since this right would apply to everyone, the three-
judge panel found that it is "illusory" and absurd. 130 
The three-judge panel recognized that too much uncertain-
ty existed as to whom the district court's judgment applied.13l 
It found that, since all three patient-plaintiffs were deceased 
by the time of the appeal, the district court's judgment was 
moot as it relates to the original patient-plaintiffs.132 The en 
bane court rejected this determination, stating that "since the 
District Court properly granted the physicians standing to as-
sert the rights of their terminally ill patients in general, it is 
clear that this case was not rendered moot by the death of the 
three named patients."133 The three-judge panel found that 
127. [d. at *34. These proposed safeguards include, but are not limited to: (1) 
witnesses to ensure voluntariness; (2) reasonable, though short, waiting periods to 
prevent rash decisions; (3) second medical opinions to confirm the patient's termi-
nal status and to confmn that the patient has been receiving proper medical 
treatment, including adequate comfort care; (4) psychological examinations to en-
sure that the patient is not suffering from momentary or treatable depression; and 
(5) reporting procedures that will aid in the avoidance of abuse. [d. 
[d. 
[W]e believe that sufficient protections can and will be 
developed by the various states, with the assistance of the 
medical profession and health care industry, to ensure 
that the possibility of error will be remote. We do not ex-
pect that, in this nation, the development of appropriate 
statutes and regulations will be taken lightly by any of 
the interested parties, or that those charged with their 
enforcement will fail to perform their duties properly. 
128. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
129. [d. at 591. See supra text accompanying notes 84-94 for discussion. 
130. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590-91. See supra text accompanying 
notes 84-94 for discussion. 
131. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593. 
132. [d. 
133. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848, at "'3 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (citing Compassion in Dying v. State of 
23
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the district court did not define "terminally ill". 134 The three-
judge panel refused to assume that the definition used in an-
other Washington statute could be applied here. l35 Therefore, 
since the district court did not attempt to specify to whom this 
right would apply, the district court created an "amorphous 
class of beneficiaries ... in this non-class action."136 The en 
bane court recognized the difficulties in defining "terminally 
ill," but found that the term "is neither indefinable nor unde-
fined.,,137 Therefore, the en bane court held that definitional 
difficulties are not reason enough to deny that a liberty inter-
est in hastening one's own death exists. 138 
B. EQUAL PROTECTION 
The three-judge panel continued its analysis by distin-
guishing patients simply refusing life support from those seek-
ing medical help to actively bring about death. 139 Since the 
Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. 1994». 
134. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593. 
135. ld. The definition states: 
"Tenninal condition" means an incurable and irreversible 
condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, that, within 
reasonable medical judgment, will cause death within a 
reasonable period of time in accordance with accepted 
medical standards, and where the application of life-sus-
taining treatment serves only to prolong the process of 
dying. 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020(9) (West Supp. 1995). 
The three-judge panel stated the difficulties with such an assumption are: 
(1) that "tenninally ill" and "tenninal condition" are different terms; (2) that con-
siderable variation exists as to whom the plaintiffs consider to be tenninally ill; 
and (3) that the states disagree in their definitions of "tenninally ill." Compassion 
in Dying, 49 F.3d at 593. The three-judge panel then stated that life itself is a 
terminal condition, whereas a tenninal illness varies depending on the kind of 
illness it is and the time that illness takes to cause death. [d. 
136. Id. 
137. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *32. 
138. Id. "[Ilt is apparent that purported definitional difficulties that have re-
peatedly been surmounted provide no legitimate reason for refusing to recognize a 
liberty interest in hastening one's death." Id. 
139. See Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591, 593-94. The three-judge panel 
held that in one instance a patient merely requests the ending of unwanted treat-
ment, as opposed to a patient who "seeks the right to have a second person col-
laborate in [his or herl death." [d. at 594. 
The three-judge panel cited Cruzan to show that a distinction between the 
two types of death exists, based on the fact that "the majority of States in: this 
country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to com-
24
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three-judge panel found that this difference does not involve 
either a fundamental right or a suspect classification, it ap-
plied a rational basis test. 14O The three-judge panel held that 
the plaintiffs failed to prove that the Washington State statute 
had no rational basis to be upheld. 141 Because the en bane 
court held that a violation of due process rendered the statute 
unconstitutional, it found it unnecessary to consider the 
plaintiffs' equal protection argument and declined to address 
it. 142 
V. CRITIQUE 
A. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIE EXISTS 
The United States Supreme Court has extended due pro-
cess rights in the past when it has found the right to be "deep-
ly rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"l43 or "of the 
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. " 144 
mit suicide." [d. at 591 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 
U.S. 261, 280 (1990». However, the three-judge panel did not acknowledge that 
the very issue in this case is whether those criminal penalties are constitutional 
in the context at issue. See id. In addition, the three-judge panel noted that the 
common law doctrine of informed consent allows one to have or reject medical 
treatment as the patient sees fit. [d. at 594. The touching of a person by another 
without informed consent is battery. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. The patient has 
"the right to be let alone." Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594 (quoting 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting». 
However, the three-judge panel explained that when a patient asks someone else 
to cause death, the patient is doing more than merely asking to be let alone. [d. 
It reasoned that this is a different kind of action than merely refusing medical 
treatment. See id. 
140. [d. at 593-94. The three-judge panel held that this distinction must be 
upheld unless patient-plaintiffs can show "that the legislature's actions were irra-
tional." [d. at 593 (quoting Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 
458 (1988». 
141. [d. at 594. 
142. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *39. "One constitutional violation 
is enough to support the judgment that we reach here." [d. 
143. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). "[T]he Constitu-
tion protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the 
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." [d. (emphasis add-
ed). 
144. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). "The right to trial by jury 
and the immunity from prosecution except as the result of an indictment may 
have value and importance. Even so, they are not of the very essence of a scheme 
of ordered liberty." [d. (emphasis added). 
25
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1. Nation's History and Tradition 
To extend due process to the right to die, the three-judge 
panel of the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying v. State of 
Washington required this proposed right to have foundation in 
the traditions and history of our nation. l45 Since the three-
judge panel concluded that no such foundation exists, it re-
fused to extend due process rights to a terminally ill patient's 
personal decision to die. 146 However, the en bane court en-
gaged in a comprehensive examination of American history 
and tradition to support its finding of a liberty interest. 147 
Courts have determined that the Constitution is a living, 
dynamic document, susceptible to interpretation and expansion 
regarding the right of personal privacy or a guarantee of cer-
tain areas or zones of privacy.l48 In Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the United States Su-
preme Court agreed with this view that the Fourteenth 
Amendment interest must not be defined too specifically.149 
145. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 
1995). "In the two hundred and five years of our existence no constitutional right 
to aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and upheld by a court of final 
jurisdiction. . . . [A] federal court should not invent a constitutional right unknown 
to the past .... " [d. 
146. See id. 
147. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848, at *11-16 (9th eir. Mar. 6, 1996). See also supra notes 100-01 and accom-
panying text for further discussion. 
148. Michigan v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212, at *7 (Mich. Cir. 
Ct. Dec. 13, 1993). 
[An exclusively historical analysis] would place a 
straightjacket upon the Constitution, and not permit it to 
be the living, dynamic document that has endured for -
more than 200 years - a document that has guided our 
society through changing mores and attitudes; a document 
that permits protection of fundamental liberty and person-
al privacy, even when history and tradition would severe-
ly intrude in these areas. 
[d. See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reZ. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
149. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805. 
It is also tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process 
Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most 
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This was not the first time the Court recognized that narrowly 
restricting a constitutional analysis of liberty interests to a list 
of enumerated rights would prohibit society's ability to prog-
ress and mature. 150 In addition, the framers of the Constitu-
tion intended that it be general and dynamic in nature. 151 
Therefore, despite the three-judge panel's concern that "no 
constitutional right to aid in killing oneself has ever been as-
serted and upheld,"152 history and tradition reveal the value 
of self-determination, including "the right of every individual to 
specific level, that were protected against governmental 
interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified. But such a view would be incon-
sistent with our law. It is a promise of the Constitution 
that there is a realm of personal liberty which the govern-
ment may not enter. 
[d. (emphasis added). The Court offered Loving v. Virginia as an example of the 
Court finding a liberty interest protected against state interference, despite the 
fact that marriage is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. [d. (citing Lov· 
ing, 388 U.S. at 12). The Court cites other examples of the Supreme Court derm-
ing liberty interests where none was defined in the Constitution. [d. (citing Turner 
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 
684-86 (1977); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82, 486-88 (Goldberg, J., joined by 
Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring), 500-02 (Harlan, J., concurring in judg-
ment), 502-07 (White, J., concurring in judgment); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923». 
150. See Casey, 112 S. Ct at 2805. 
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the pre-
cise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in 
the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated 
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the 
freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep 
and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, 
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial 
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . and 
which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive 
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly 
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their 
abridgment. 
[d. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from 
dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)) (emphasis added). 
151. Frederick, supra note 55, at 77. "[A] minute detail of particular rights is 
certainly far less applicable to a constitution like that under consideration, which 
is merely intended to regulate the general political interest of the nation, than to 
one which has the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns." 
[d. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton» (emphasis added). 
152. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
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the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others unless by clear and unques-
tioned authority of law.,,153 Therefore, the en banc court cor-
rectly recognized that this tradition includes choices about 
death. 154 
2. Liberty Interest 
In Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, without 
any legal authority or analysis, the three-judge panel dis-
missed Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey155 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health 156 
as precedent to assert the right to die. 157 This action conflicts 
with the three-judge panel's particular concern for adhering to 
legal precedent. 158 
Casey defined what issues fall within the Fourteenth 
Amendment's liberty interest. 159 The United States Supreme 
153. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
154. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848, at *18 (9th Cir Mar. 6, 1996). 
Certainly, few decisions are more personal, intimate or 
important than the decision to end one's life, especially 
when the reason for doing so is to avoid excessive and 
protracted pain. Accordingly, we believe the cases from 
Pierce through Roe provide strong general support for our 
conclusion that a liberty interest in controlling the time 
and manner of one's death is protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
[d. See also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 343 (1990) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). "Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty, 
and the concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our own 
mortality are undoubtedly 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people 
as to be ranked as fundamental.'" [d. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97, 105 (1934». 
155. 112 S. Ct 2791 (1992). 
156. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
157. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
158. [d. at 591. 
159. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807. Casey held: 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal deci-
sions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, child rearing, and education... . 
These matters . . . involving the most intimate and per-
sonal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices 
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Court acknowledged that its purpose did not include imposing 
a particular moral standard upon the people. 160 The same 
kind of decision employed in the abortion right exists in the 
right to die.161 A terminally ill patient's decision between life 
Id. 
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to 
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At 
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could 
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed 
under compulsion of the State. 
The Supreme Court has also held that "lilt is clear that among the deci-
sions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are 
personal decisions 'relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia; procreation, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson; contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird; family relation-
ships, Prince v. Massachusetts; and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters; Meyer v. Nebraska.'" Carey v. Population Servo Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-
85 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973» (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). Furthermore, an "interest in independence in making certain 
kinds of important decisions" exists. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) 
(referring to decision-making within the doctor-patient relationship). The Court 
held that abortion falls into this liberty interest. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807. 
160. Id. at 2806. 
Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our 
most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control 
our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, 
not to mandate our own moral code. The underlying con-
stitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these 
philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a 
woman lacks all choice in the matter. 
Id. 
161. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848, at *19 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). "Like the decision of whether or not to have 
an abortion, the decision how and when to die is one of 'the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal 
dignity and autonomy.'" Id. 
[I]t does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe 
[abortion] in all instances. That is because the liberty of 
the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human 
condition and so unique to the law. . . . Her suffering is 
too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without 
more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however 
dominant that vision has been in the course of our his-
tory and culture. The destiny of the woman must be 
shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her 
spiritual imperatives and her place in society. . . . These 
are intimate views with infinite variations, and their 
deep, personal character underlay our decisions in 
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey. 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807-08. 
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and death directly affects his or her life, much the same way a 
woman's choice to have an abortion will directly affect her 
life. 162 
The Cruzan Court brought the interest in making personal 
decisions to the context of decisions to die. 163 Cruzan held 
that a right to refuse all medical treatment, including life-
saving hydration and nutrition, is constitutionally protect-
ed. l64 This right adheres even if the withdrawal of treatment 
will result in death.165 Thus, by giving a terminally ill, men-
tally competent patient the right to remove treatment, the 
United States Supreme Court created a constitutional right to 
die.166 Encompassed within this right to die is the right to as-
sistance to die.167 Fortunately, the en bane court recognized 
162. Brief of Appellees at 12, n.9, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 
49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.) (No. 94-35534) (1995). Patient-plaintiffs point out that none 
of the conflicting interests in the abortion decision exist in the terminally ill 
patient's decision: 
ld. 
The counterpart to "the woman who must live with her 
decision" is the terminally ill patient, who will not survive 
the act in question. The "persons who perform and assist 
the procedure" will only do so if they support the 
patient's decision. The interests of "spouse, family and 
society which must confront the knowledge that . . . pro-
cedures that some deem an act of violence against an 
innocent life [exist]" are not implicated since there is no 
"innocent life". Indeed, interests of spouse, family and 
society will be advanced by recognizing the patient's 
rights, thereby easing the burden on families who now 
watch helplessly as loved ones beg futilely for assistance 
in easing a tortured death. The interest of the separate 
"life that is aborted" has no counterpart in the decision of 
a dying person to hasten his or her own death. 
163. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). "The 
choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and over-
whelming finality." ld. at 281. By reviewing the standard of proof for deciding if 
the patient made this choice, the Court demonstrated that its interest was in 
ensuring a voluntary decision, not in interfering with this decision. See id. at 282-
85. 
164. ld. at 279. 
165. See w. 
166. ld. See Helms, supra note 78, at 174-76. 
167. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848, at *8 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). The en bane court cited Roe v. Wade to dem-
onstrate that the Supreme Court first determined that a liberty interest in a cer-
tain medical procedure (abortion) existed. ld. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973». It then proceeded to hold that assistance in obtaining that medical proce-
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the value of abortion and right-to-die precedents as they relate 
to this case. 168 
In Compassion in Dying, the three-judge panel failed to 
recognize that the zone of privacy within the Fourteenth 
Amendment's liberty interest includes a right to make deci-
sions within the context of a doctor-patient relationship.169 A 
patient's confidence in this doctor-patient relationship is essen-
tial when that patient makes end-of-life decisions. 17o Since a 
terminally ill patient's decision to die through treatment or 
lack of treatment is typically within the doctor-patient rela-
dure must necessarily exist. [d. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113). Like the Washington 
statute at issue, the statute in Roe only prohibited assisting in the procedure, but 
did not prohibit performing that procedure on oneself. [d. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 
151-52). See also Brief of Appellees at 14, n.12, Compassion in Dying, (No. 94-
35534); supra note 99 for further discussion. 
168. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). 
169. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). Whalen did not disturb the lower 
court's holding that the "doctor-patient relationship is one of the zones of privacy 
accorded to constitutional protection." Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 936 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 
(1977). Supporting the interpretation that the Court's omission could be construed 
to include the doctor-patient relationship in the privacy interest is Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413, U.S. 49, 66, n.13 (1973): "[T]he constitutionally protected 
privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just 
concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship. Such 
protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital . . . or as otherwise 
required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved." See also Todd David 
Robichaud, Toward a More Perfect Union: A Federal Cause of Action for Physician 
Aid-in-Dying, 27 U. MICH J.L. REF. 521, 532-33 (1994). 
170. See QUILL, supra note 14, at 44-52. Dr. Quill discusses the important val-
ues involved when a physician consults with his or her patient about treatment 
decisions. [d. These values include informed, shared decision-making between pa-
tient and doctor; person-centered care and respect for the patient's decisions; ac-
knowledging the powers and limitations of medical care; the problems with pro-
longing life at the expense of the patient's desire to reduce suffering; and a 
patient's dignified death. [d. 
[d. at 52. 
[The physician's role is] to inform and learn from each 
person; to help them make the best choices, given their 
values and the nature of their illnesses; to ensure that 
they did not feel unnecessarily isolated and to try to give 
them as much control and latitude as possible. Caring 
humanely for the dying and trying to help them find a 
dignified death is a fundamentally vital role for physi-
cians. 
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tionship, this decision invokes the privacy interest of that rela-
tionship.17l 
B. STATE INTERESTS 
Once a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause is 
found, the individual's constitutional rights must be balanced 
against relevant state interests to determine whether those 
rights were violated.172 The Washington Supreme Court had 
listed its interests against allowing physician-assisted death 
as: the preservation of life; the protection of interests of inno-
cent third parties; the prevention of suicide; and the mainte-
nance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.173 
However, in Compassion in Dying, the three-judge panel erro-
neously listed Washington's interests based upon two task 
force reports issued in different states, neither of which were 
available to the district court during the original proceed-
ings.174 In addition, some of these listed interests do not re-
late to the issue presented in this case; specifically, whether 
the right to die applies to terminally ill, mentally competent 
adults, who, uncoerced, choose to hasten death. 175 The en 
171. Id. at 45-46. 
172. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) 
(citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982»; Compassion in Dying, 1996 
WL 94848, at *5. 
173. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (Wash. 1987) (citing In re 
Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983». 
174. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 592 (9th 
Cir. 1995). New York and Michigan issued the task force reports. Id. See supra 
note 111 for a discussion of these task force reports. See supra notes 112-122 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the interests. 
175. See Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592-93. For example, the three-judge 
panel stated there is an "interest in protecting all of the handicapped from societal 
indifference and antipathy." Id. This interest may be important, but it is irrelevant 
in the context at issue which includes only terminally ill patients, not otherwise 
disabled people. In addition, the three-judge panel is concerned that elderly or 
infirm people will be subjected to psychological pressure to consent to their death 
and that minorities and the poor will be exploited. Id. at 592. Although these are 
important concerns, they are misplaced here because this case concerns a volun-
tary, uncoerced decision to hasten death, without psychological or economic pres-
sure or exploitation. These valid concerns might fall into the interest against 
abuse also cited, but unexplained, by the three-judge panel. See id. at 592-93. 
Despite the three-judge panel's concern for possible abuse, legalizing physi-
cian-assisted death and providing for strict guidelines might actually reduce any 
abuse already in existence. See QUILL, supra note 14, at 167. 
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bane court did not commit this same error, but instead listed 
state interests which overlap and even expand those articulat-
ed by the Washington Supreme Court.176 The following dis-
There may be more risk for abuse and idiosyncratic deci-
sion-making with such secret practices than with a more 
open, carefully defined practice. . . . [T]here is more risk 
for vulnerable patients and for the integrity of the profes-
sion in such hidden practices, however well intended, than 
there would be in a more open process restricted to com-
petent patients who met carefully defined criteria. 
[d. at 166-67. Various surveys show that between 3% and 37% of responding phy-
sicians have secretly hastened a patient's death. [d. at 159. However, since no 
legal or professional guidelines were in effect, every one of these doctors may have 
committed an "abuse" by not following any proscribed safeguards. See id. at 167. 
For instance, Dr. Jack Kevorkian administered an "abuse" when he allegedly 
helped a breast cancer patient to die. Body in Auto is Reported to be Kevorkian's 
26th Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, November 9, 1995, at A14. However, after the 
patient's autopsy, the medical examiner disputed the presence of any cancer in the 
patient. After Her Suicide, a Clash Over How III a Kevorkian Patient Was, N.Y. 
TIMES, November 10, 1995, at A13. If guidelines existed, which would include 
requiring other physicians' diagnoses that the patient is, indeed, terminally ill, 
abuses such as these would be greatly reduced. See QUILL, supra note 14, at 166-
67. 
Dr. Quill presents the following potential guidelines: (1) The patient must 
repeatedly request to die. The physician must understand the consequences to the 
patient if the patient is forced to continue suffering. This will help the doctor to 
establish the rationality of the patient's choice. [d. at 161. (2) The patient must 
make his or her decision with the understanding of its implications and conse-
quences. The physician must make sure this decision is not due to depression. The 
patient should also undergo a psychiatric evaluation. [d. at 161-62. (3) The patient 
must be incurably and terminally ill with a condition that causes severe, unrelent-
ing, intolerable suffering and pain. The patient's decision should be based on 
avoiding any more of this suffering. [d. at 162. (4) The patient's decision must not 
be based on inadequate comfort care. That is, all reasonable methods of comfort 
care must be considered and exhausted before considering hastening death. [d. (5) 
Hastening death should only be done in the context of a meaningful doctor-patient 
relationship. Unlike Dr. Kevorkian's methods, the doctor and the patient should 
have had a relationship not based solely on the request to hasten death. At the 
very least, the doctor should try to know the patient and make sure the patient 
has made a decision that is right for him or her. [d. at 162-63. (6) The physician 
should consult another doctor to ensure that the patient's decision is voluntary 
and uncoerced, that it is not based on depression or other factors, and that the 
patient's diagnosis and prognosis is accurate. [d. at 163. (7) Precise documentation 
should exist to ensure the prior conditions have been met. This would include 
requiring the patient, the primary physician, and the consulting physician or phy-
sicians to sign a consent form. [d. at 163-64. (8) No physician should be required 
to participate in the patient's decision if that physician's personal feelings and 
beliefs are contrary to hastening death. [d. at 163. 
176. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848, at *21 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). See id. at *21-33 for the en banc court's 
thorough discussion of the state interests it identified, which are: (1) preserving 
life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) avoiding the involvement of third parties and in 
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cussion focuses specifically on the state interests previously set 
forth by the Washington Supreme Court.177 
1. Preservation of Life 
The Washington Supreme Court has held that interest in 
preserving life "weakens considerably... if treatment will 
merely postpone death for a person with a terminal and incur-
able condition .... [T]he terminally ill individual's right ... 
must prevail.'>178 In addition, the United States Supreme 
Court recognized that the interest in preserving life is not 
absolute when it guaranteed the right to withdraw medical 
treatment, even for those who will die. 179 The Supreme Court 
also acknowledged that it could not substitute its own moral 
judgment about the meaning of life in place of an individual's 
judgment. 180 Washington State also acknowledged that its 
interest in the preservation of life is not absolute. 181 
precluding the uses of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) protecting family 
members and loved ones; (5) protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and 
(6) avoiding adverse consequences. Id. 
177. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (Wash. 1987) (citing In re 
Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983». 
178. Id. Other jurisdictions have also held this interest weakens as the patient 
approaches death. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976); Superintendent of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (Mass. 1977). 
179. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). See 
also Frederick, supra note 55, at 88-89. 
180. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 
2791, 2806 (1992). "[Tlhe regulation of constitutionally protected decisions ... 
must be predicated on legitimate state concerns other than disagreement with the 
choice the individual has made. . .. Otherwise, the interest in liberty protected by 
the Due Process Clause would be a nullity." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 313 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990» (ellipsis in 
original). 
181. See generally WASH. REV.' CODE ANN. § 70.122.010 et seq. (West & Supp. 
1995). By allowing a terminally ill patient on life support to decide to have that 
support withdrawn, Washington recognizes that not all lives require preservation 
at all costs. See generally id. Although Washington has a legitimate interest in 
preventing suicide and preserving life, it has carved out an exception for terminal-
ly ill patients by allowing for this withdrawal without any sanctions against the 
patient's physicians. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.030(1), 70.122.051 (West 
Supp. 1995). 
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2. Protection of Third Party Interests 
The interest in protecting third parties stems from the 
state's interest to intervene to protect innocent lives, particu-
larly a patient's minor children. 182 However, New York's 
highest court held that "the patient's right to decide the course 
of his or her own medical treatment [is] not conditioned on the 
patient being without minor children .... [A state cannot pro-
hibit parents from] engaging in dangerous activities because 
there is a risk that their children will be left orphans. "183 Ad-
ditionally, allowing the patient to choose to die will actually 
serve the third party's interest because terminating the 
patient's pain and suffering will also relieve the incredible 
amount of stress and emotional distress experienced by the 
third party.184 In any case, this decision is usually made as a 
family, accounting for the interests of each family member.185 
3. Prevention of Suicide 
Suicide is often defined as an irrational choice to die gen-
erally resulting from mental illness or severe depression. 185 
However, the majority of terminally ill people who choose to 
hasten death do not make this decision based on mental illness 
or depression. 187 The Washington Legislature could introduce 
safeguards to prevent terminally ill persons from hastening 
death based on depression. 188 Therefore, rational "suicide," 
such as the type presented in Compassion in Dying, should not 
182. Robichaud, supra note 169, at 537. 
183. [d. (quoting Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 83-84 (N.Y. 1990». 
184. Scott I. Davidson, But, Why Do We Shoot Horses?: An Analysis of the 
Right to Die and Euthanasia, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 115, 128 (1994). 
185. [d. 
186. See HUMPHRY, supra note 14, at 12-13; QUILL, supra note 14, at 115. 
187. Brief of Appellees at 15, n.13, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washing-
ton, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.) (94-35534) (1995). "[I]t is a myth that major clinical 
depression ordinarily accompanies terminal illness." [d. (quoting NEW YORK STATE 
TASK FORCE, supra note 111, at 16, 21). Furthermore, the report acknowledges 
that depression in the terminally ill can be diagnosed. [d. (quoting NEW YORK 
STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 111, at 13, 26). 
188. [d. at 16. 
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be criminalized based on the same policies as irrational 
suicide. 189 
In addition, Washington's interest in preventing suicide is 
not absolute because no Washington statute prohibits the act 
of suicide.190 Preventing suicide in the context at issue really 
means prolonging the dying process for terminally ill pa-
tients. 191 Washington has already recognized the need for an 
exception to its interest against suicide in cases of terminally 
ill patients by allowing these patients to make the decision to 
withdraw life sustaining treatment, even if this withdrawal 
will result in death. 192 However, inexplicably, Washington al-
lows this exception for only some of its terminally ill patients, 
rather than all. 193 
4. Interest in the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession 
The three-judge panel based its concern about the ethical 
integrity of the medical profession on the concept that a doctor 
dominates over his or her patients, thereby having the ability 
to inflict undue influence to obtain a consent to death. 194 
However, when dealing with dying patients, a physician's role 
is to care humanely for those patients and to help them find a 
dignified death. 195 If the patient and the doctor agree that all 
189. See Frederick, supra note 55, at 93-94. 
190. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1464, n.9 
(W.D. Wash. 1994). See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988). 
This statute amended the previous Washington statute which prohibited attempted 
suicide, by removing that prohibition. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1464, 
n.9. The Washington Legislature determined that the person who attempted sui-
cide should not be punished if the attempt was unsuccessful. Id. Therefore, if a 
physician helps another to commit suicide, only the physician is legally responsi-
ble, not the person who chose to die. Id. 
191. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1464. 
192. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1995) (permitting 
withdrawal of medical treatment, even if the withdrawal is sure to result in 
death). 
193. See id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988). 
194. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 592 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
195. QUILL, supra note 14, at 52. More specifically, a physician should inform 
and learn from each patient; help the patient make the best decision; prevent the 
feeling of isolation in the patient; and give the patient as much control and lati-
tude as possible. Id. 
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comfort care methods are exhausted and hastened death is the 
only answer, the doctor would be forced either to ignore the 
patient's request due to legal constraints, or to act in secret 
without the benefits of consultation, support from colleagues, 
and compliance with other possible safeguards.196 One noted 
physician concluded that this secret practice will actually harm 
medical integrity because this "covert practice discourages 
open and honest communication between physicians, their col-
leagues, and their dying patients."197 
c. EQuAL PROTECTION 
Washington State allows one to hasten death passively by 
withdrawing treatment or nutrition and hydration, but does 
not allow one to actively take steps to hasten death. 198 As no 
distinction between active or assisted death and passive death 
exists, Washington violated the equal protection rights of those 
who request to hasten death but are "unfortunate" to not re-
quire life-sustaining treatment to remain alive. 199 
Both passive and active death require another person to 
help effectuate death. 20o Active steps must be taken by the 
physician to ensure the death of the patient.201 In either in-
stance, death would not occur but for the physician's active 
participation.202 As Cruzan held that a patient has the right 
196. Id. at 166. 
197. Id. 
198. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988); In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 
454 (Wash. 1987). 
199. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 597 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
200. Helms, supra note 78, at 176. "By withdrawing nutrition and hydration 
from a patient . . . the physician sets in course an action that will inevitably and 
directly cause the death of the patient .... [D]eath is [now] certain and has been 
purposely induced. . . . If action is being purposely taken that will bring about 
certain death, merely waiting for the effect of that action will seem inhumane." Id. 
at 176-77, n.23 (quoting Victor G. Rosenblum & Clarke D. Forsythe, The Right to 
Assisted Suicide: Protection of Autonomy or an Open Door to Social Killing?, 8 
ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 24-25 (1990». 
201. Id. at 177. 
202. Id. "Turning off the respirator is viewed by some physicians as an act 
which directly involves the doctor in ending the patient's life. . . . [T]uming off 
the respirator is euthanasia in the sense of direct[ly causing death]." Id. at 177, 
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to request the physician to actively remove all life-sustaining 
treatment, the doctor is not liable or culpable when he or she 
removes that treatment.203 As a result, the doctor's legal cul-
pability, or lack thereof, is the same in either case.204 In both 
instances, the doctor acts to end the patient's suffering accord-
ing to that patient's rational decision.205 Further, in his 
Cruzan concurrence, Justice Scalia stated that there is no legal 
distinction between actively or passively causing one's own 
death.2°° 
Therefore, as no legal distinction between active and pas-
sive death exists, Washington's disparate treatment of termi-
nally ill patients must be narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling state interest.207 Washington's interests are not compel-
ling enough to outweigh terminally ill patients' equal protec-
tion rights.208 Therefore, the three-judge panel erroneously 
found the Washington statute constitutiona1.209 The en bane 
court should have considered and upheld the district court's 
decision that the statute violated equal protection, in order to 
resolve this area in the law and set precedent for the fu-
ture.210 
n.28 (quoting DIANE CRANE, THE SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSICIAN'S TREAT-
MENT OF CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS 74 (1975». 
203. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
204. Helms, supra note 78, at 178. 
205. [d. 
206. Cruzan 497 U.S. at 296-97. Scalia's concurrence in Cruzan states: 
[d. 
Starving oneself to death is no different from putting a 
gun to one's temple as far as the common law definition 
of suicide is concerned; the cause of death in both cases 
is the suicide's conscious decision to put an end to his 
own existence. [Tlhe common law [alsol rejected the ac-
tion-inaction distinction in other contexts involving the 
taking of human life. 
207. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 597 (9th Cir. 
1995) (Wright, J., dissenting) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985». 
208. See supra notes 172-197 and accompanying text for discussion. 
209. See Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d 586, 594-97; Petition for Rehear-
ingISuggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washing-
ton, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.) (No. 94-35534) (1995). 
210. The en bane court declined to consider the plaintiffs equal protection 
claim, holding that its analysis of the due process liberty interest was sufficient to 
declare the Washington statute unconstitutional as it applied to terminally ill, 
mentally competent adults, who request physician-prescribed medication to hasten 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, the three-
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a terminally ill, 
mentally competent adult has no right to a doctor's assistance 
in terminating his or her life.211 That is, the three-judge pan-
el held that a due process liberty interest in actively causing 
one's own death, and assistance to do so, does not exist.212 
Neither does an equal protection right exist, as compared to 
those similarly situated patients who may remove life-saving 
treatment or nutrition and hydration, resulting in death.213 
However, in a comprehensive opinion, the Ninth Circuit en 
bane court reversed the three-judge panel's opinion.214 
Analogizing Compassion in Dying to previous cases regarding 
abortion and the right-to-die, the en bane court held that "a 
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in determining the 
time and manner of one's own death" exists.215 The en bane 
court weighed this liberty interest against six state interests 
identified by the court.216 These interests include a general 
state interest in preserving life, and a more specific state inter-
est in preventing suicide.217 Additionally, the court identified 
the state's other interests as avoiding the involvement of third 
parties and precluding the use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue 
influence; protecting family members and loved ones; protect-
ing the integrity of the medical profession; and avoiding ad-
verse consequences if the statute at issue is declared unconsti-
tutional. 218 After balancing these interests, the en bane court 
held that the statutory language, "or aids another person to 
attempt suicide," violates the Due Process Clause of the Four-
their deaths. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848, at *39 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). 
211. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), 
rev'g 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 
(9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996). 
212. [d. 
213. [d. 
214. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 
94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996), rev'g 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). 
215. [d. at *1, 6-21. 
216. [d. at *21. 
217. [d. at *1, 21-26. 
218. [d. at * 1, 26-33. 
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teenth Amendment, since it prohibits physicians from prescrib-
ing life-ending medication to terminally ill, mentally competent 
adults who choose to hasten their own deaths.219 
The en bane intentionally did not address the equal protec-
tion argument.220 The en bane court stated that since it al-
ready held that the statute is unconstitutional as applied, it 
did not need to address whether a second constitutional viola-
tion existed.221 
Right-to-die issues have received much publicity in the 
recent past, and have been the subject of considerable litiga-
tion across the nation. To quell the litigation and establish a 
clear constitutional interpretation, the United States Supreme 
Court surely will need to address this sensitive and controver-
sial issue. 
Cara Elkin· 
219. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *1, 37-38. The statute at issue 
in this case states: 
Promoting a suicide attempt. (1) A person is guilty of pro-
moting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or 
aids another person to attempt suicide. (2) Promoting a 
suicide is a Class C felony. 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988). 
220. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848, at *39. 
221. [d . 
.. Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996. This note is dedi-
cated to my father, Martin Elkin. 
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